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Assessing the Role of Inward Foreign Direct Investment 
in Chinese Economic Development, 1990-2007: Towards a Synthesis of Alternative Views 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the context of globalization, China has been widely regarded as the most successful country in the 
world in utilizing inward foreign direct investment (FDI) for economic development. The mainstream 
of the literature has produced a wide range of studies that are largely within the theoretical framework 
of neoclassical economics, and they tend to conclude that FDI has contributed significantly to Chinese 
economic development – through capital formation, export expansion, technology transfer, and the 
transformation of the economic structures and institutions. The objective of this paper is to assess the 
role of FDI in Chinese economic development with reference to the broader theoretical literature on 
FDI and late development, which encompasses structuralism and radical political economy along with 
neoclassical economics. From the perspectives of the broader literature, the analyses of the paper find 
that FDI in China has indeed promoted economic development in one respect (improving allocative 
efficiency), but has also had unfavourable effect in another respect (worsening productive efficiency), 
resulting in an overall impact that tends to be on the negative side. The mainstream story of China is 
thus judged to be partial, and the lessons to be drawn from the experience are arguably far more 
complex than have been hitherto perceived. 
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1. Introduction 
 
China has been amongst the world‟s largest recipient countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
since the early 1990s. In 2002, the first year after the country‟s accession to the World Trade 
Organization, it for one time surpassed the United States of America to become the largest FDI 
recipient. The amount of FDI which it receives continued to expand in the subsequent years, reaching 
a total of US dollar 84 billion in 2007, which was equivalent to 15% of the total flows to all 
developing economies in that year. The outbreak of the financial crisis in developed countries in 2008, 
and the world-scale recession that followed, did slow down FDI flows to China and the developing 
world as a whole. Nevertheless, as far as China is concerned, this slow-down has been temporary. FDI 
flows to China decreased by 12% in 2009, but then rebounded by a hefty 21% in 2010 and continued 
to increase steadily thereafter. By 2014, the flows to China amounted to US dollar 129 billion, which 
was equivalent to 19% of the total flows to all developing economies (data from United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report, various issues). 
 Assessing the role FDI has played in Chinese economic development is thus of enormous 
policy and intellectual importance. Indeed, international institutions such as the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), etc. – which can be considered as representative of the mainstream establishments in the world 
political-economic orders – have been outspoken in portraying China as a „model‟ for the rest of the 
developing world in utilizing FDI for economic development. And the mainstream of existing 
scholarly studies has been in support of this endeavour. Analytically, the studies mostly treat FDI as 
additional productive resources over and above the domestic stock. Whether in the form of additional 
savings, foreign exchange availability, technology transfer, or a catalyst for the formation of efficient 
institutions, FDI flows are taken to be of such nature. No wonder, the studies have mostly concluded 
that FDI flows have been conducive, even crucial, to Chinese economic development. 
 We believe these studies are partial in analytics and problematic in conclusions. Their 
analytics tends to centre on propositions framed according to neoclassical economics, while ignoring 
the contribution from alternative theoretical traditions. Yet, the literature on international investment 
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has never been clearly dominated by neoclassical economics. Equally influential is the structuralist 
tradition, which, based on theories of industrial organization, has developed various propositions 
arguing that FDI could suffocate late development by killing off local firms or distorting the structure 
of local industries. And there is the tradition of radical political economy. Based on Marxist theories 
of the labour process, the proposition of deskilling contends that FDI flows could put the recipient 
economy in a „low value-added, low compensation‟ development trap. Based on Marxist or Post 
Keynesian macroeconomics, the proposition of the internationalization of capital contends that FDI 
flows could worsen the problem of global demand deficiency in the long term. These structuralist and 
radical propositions, whilst not necessarily being antithetical to neoclassical economics, do provide 
insightful alternative perspectives from which actual experiences can be analysed and assessed. 
 The objective of this paper is to attempt an assessment of the role of FDI in Chinese economic 
development. We analyse the experience by way of verifying the applicability of the propositions in 
the structuralist, radical, and neoclassical traditions. Our analysis focuses on developments up until 
2007. The economic situation following the outbreak of the world-scale financial crisis in 2008 has 
thrown new lights on the implications of FDI flows to China, about which we will also offer a 
preliminary, brief discussion towards the end of the paper. The paper is organized in five sections. 
Following this introduction, section two briefly reviews relevant theoretical issues and the literature of 
applied studies on China‟s experience. Section three examines the main features of FDI in China in 
light of the preceding literature surveys. Section four analyses the efficiency performance of foreign 
capital-invested enterprises at the sectoral and regional levels. Section five concludes the paper.  
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives and Existing Studies 
 
The literature on FDI and late development is vast. Broadly speaking, three established theoretical 
traditions, each of which being comprised of a range of analytical propositions, are discernible. The 
propositions are based on either theoretical arguments or generalized empirical observations, or both 
(for elaborate reviews on the theoretical traditions, see, e.g., Aitken and Harrison 1999, Lo 2012 ch.2, 
OECD 2002, Saggi 2002, Singh 2005, Smarzynska 2002, Tang et al. 2008, and UNCTAD 1999). 
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 The first tradition, generally considered to be the mainstream for its association with major 
international agencies (especially the World Bank and other „Washington Institutions‟), is largely 
based on neoclassical economics. Its views on the role of FDI in late development comprise the 
following main propositions: first, FDI represents the availability of additional financial resources, 
over and above domestic savings; second, FDI represents the availability of additional foreign 
exchange, over and above overseas borrowings and the export earnings of domestic firms; and, third, 
FDI could promote productivity growth in the recipient economy via technology transfer and 
structural/institutional change. The first proposition is standard neoclassical economics. The second 
proposition is derived from some „gap‟ models (and hence not, strictly speaking, standard 
neoclassical), where the assumption is that there exist certain produced goods that are essential to 
economic development but are not readily available from domestic producers. And the third 
proposition is broadly associated with the notion of best practices as defined in the production 
function, and ultimately determined by competition in the world market. The productivity growth 
could arise from moving towards the production frontiers, or, as some theories of endogenous growth 
tend to emphasize, realizing static and/or dynamic increasing returns. 
 The second tradition, known as structuralist development economics in the literature, whilst 
not necessarily opposing the above propositions, tends to highlight two critical drawbacks of FDI. The 
first one can be summarized as „competition kills‟. Especially where the carrier of FDI is transnational 
corporations (TNCs), which typically have technological and scale advantages over domestic firms, a 
main impact of FDI is likely to be the extension of the monopolistic power of these foreign firms into 
the domestic market. The second one can be summarized as „competition distorts‟. Again, especially 
where the carrier of FDI is TNCs, which typically have acute competition among themselves in the 
world market, a main impact of FDI is likely to be the distortion of the economic structure of the 
recipient country – in the forms of excessive duplication of industrial projects, fragmentation of the 
structures of industries, and obstruction to the development of linked upstream capital-intensive 
industries. At one level, these two propositions are an application of established theories of industrial 
organization to this particular field. At a more substantive level, the application hinges on the view 
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that, in the world market, most dynamic (fast productivity-growing) industries are characterized by 
imperfect competition and the predominance of a small number of TNCs in each of them. 
 The third tradition, known as radical political economy, comprises a range of diverse views, 
of which two groups have been most influential. One group of views have coalesced around the thesis 
of the „new international division of labour‟, which posits that deskilling is the likely outcome of the 
division of labour under modern capitalism (the „Taylorization‟ of work) and that capital export from 
advanced countries tends to be motivated by the pursuit of cheap labour. The logical expectation, in 
these views, is that such capital tends to perpetuate the position of recipient developing countries in 
specializing in low value-added production and getting low labour compensation – a development trap 
that is difficult to escape. Meanwhile, another group of views centre on the idea of the 
„internationalization of (the contradictions of) capital‟. It is posited that capital export from advanced 
countries is typically motivated by demand deficiency and/or falling profitability in the home market, 
and, by helping to create new centres of production in developing countries, it tends to result in global 
over-accumulation on an expanded scale. Consequently, by receiving such foreign capital as a means 
of integrating themselves into the world market, developing countries will often have to bear the brunt 
of severe fluctuations in the world economy – so much so that any developmental achievements they 
have made are constantly threatened to evaporate. 
 The preceding discussion on the second proposition of radical political economy reveals the 
complex financial and macroeconomic attributes of FDI flows, which are mostly assumed away in 
neoclassical economics. Conceptually, contra the neoclassical „prior-saving-finances-investment‟ 
view, the Post Keynesian-Schumpeterian theory of endogenous finance posits that finance impacts the 
economy by creating credit „out of nothing‟ (Dullien 2009, Kregel and Burlamaqui 2005). The 
relationship between savings and investment is thus more complex than the neoclassical view, and the 
availability of foreign savings via FDI flows cannot be judged as in itself indicating a contribution to 
the capital formation of recipient economies. Meanwhile, empirically, there is also an influential 
thesis from radical political economy concerning the nature of FDI flows in the era of globalization. It 
is argued that because of increasing financialization, and with it the increasing short-termism of 
investment behaviour and the increasing mobility of investment finance and earnings, the mainstream 
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view of FDI flows as a source of stable development finance is seriously in question (Kregel 1996, 
Singh 2005). This implies that the availability of additional foreign exchange via FDI flows cannot be 
judged as unquestionably a contribution to economic development.
1
 
 It must be stressed that the propositions pertaining to the different theoretical traditions as 
outlined above, while carrying ideological contents in their own right, are of analytical insights. The 
intellectual contribution of these propositions, which entail asking different questions and/or offering 
different answers, could be evaluated from the standpoint of economic development. They should thus 
be treated as analytics rather than just doctrines of belief, and their validity or otherwise is ultimately 
an empirical issue. It is with reference to this broader literature that the strength and limitation of 
existing studies on FDI and Chinese economic development can be properly assessed. 
 Existing studies have mostly followed the mainstream tradition, in the sense that they see FDI 
as, unquestionably, embodying a net addition in financial and/or technological resources for recipient 
economies. This nature of the studies is clearly stated in the reports by major international institutions, 
including OECD (2002), World Bank (2006), and Tseng and Zebregs (2002) representing the IMF. 
Subsequent works from international institutions have continued to hold this view on the nature of 
FDI, although, increasingly, they have had to take it seriously the alternative, structuralist view that 
FDI potentially could also have negative impacts on economic development (Davies 2013, Li 2013).
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 To substantiate this mainstream neoclassical view on the nature of FDI, in the literature, two 
bodies of research works have been produced. The first is simply to express various measurements of 
FDI as ratios to main indicators of economic aggregates, and thereby to „read out‟ the contribution of 
FDI to economic development. It is found that the ratio of FDI inflows to China‟s GDP, or capital 
formation, has been quite large in international comparison since the early 1990s. It is also found that, 
of China‟s rapidly expanding total exports, the share accounted for by foreign capital-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) has risen sharply (see Davies 2013, Huang 2015, Li 2013; earlier works include 
Chen et al. 1995, Kaiser et al. 1996, Zhang and Song 2000, Sun 2003). 
 The second body of works is comprised of regression analyses of the relationship between 
various measurements of FDI and indicators of economic development. The core idea thereof is both 
to examine the indirect impact of FDI on observed development indicators (such as GDP growth), 
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which does not show out in the analyses of the first body of works, and to capture the impact on 
unobserved indicators such as total factor productivity (TFP) growth. Findings of these analyses vary, 
depending on the specification of the models used for estimation, but it is generally found that the 
indicated correlations are positive and significant. Perhaps the most optimistic finding is that, over the 
1990s, FDI raised China‟s TFP growth by 2.5 percentage points. Together with the effect of raising 
GDP growth by 0.4 percentage points via its addition to capital formation, the contribution of FDI to 
China‟s economic growth over the 1990s is estimated to be near three percentage points per annum 
(Tseng and Zebregs 2002; see also the even more sanguine judgement by Whalley and Xin 2010, who 
state that without FDI inflows China‟s economic growth would have been unsustainable). 
 In the spirit of the analytics of the second body of research works, there have also been many 
studies that analyse the correlation between FDI and local economic growth – for individual regions 
or for cross-region comparison. The motivation is the easily observed fact that regions or provinces 
with a higher FDI intake have tended to exhibit faster economic growth. The analyses typically find 
that these two sides are positively and significantly correlated, and that FDI contributes to local 
economic growth via various kinds of direct or indirect impact including the addition to local capital 
formation, the crowding-in of domestic investment, and the enhancement or efficient utilization of the 
local stock of productive skill/knowledge. Inferences have thus been made that FDI does explain the 
diverse growth performance across regions, and that this holds important policy lessons for China as a 
whole (Berthélemy and Démurger 2000, Hong and Sun 2011, Madariaga and Poncet 2007, Mody and 
Wang 1997, Wei et al. 2001, Zhang and Felmingham 2002). 
 More recently, a practice that has become very popular among concerned scholars is to study 
the effects of FDI at the sector or firm level. The focus is on identifying the existence, or otherwise, of 
productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms. It is through these new studies that a complex 
picture has been revealed. Some studies find positive spillovers while some others find negative, 
depending on the cases studied and the regression models used. Perhaps more interesting are the 
attempts to identify the channels through which spillovers take effect. Some studies find that the 
impact of FDI on the output and productivity change of domestic firms varies (in degrees and between 
positive and negative measures) across industries, and between the short run and the long run (Hu and 
9 
 
Jefferson 2002, Ran et al. 2007, Xu and Sheng 2012, Jeon et al. 2013). Some others find that the 
existence or otherwise of spillovers depends on the absorptive capacity of the domestic firms (Girma 
et al. 2009, Qi et al. 2009). Still some others find that there are actually two-way spillovers between 
foreign and domestic firms (Wei et al. 2008). At any rate, there seems no consensus from these 
studies that FDI has clearly made a positive and significant contribution to Chinese economic 
development via productivity spillovers at the sector and firm levels. 
 A general point that arises from the preceding discussion concerns the importance of putting 
the analysis of the effects of FDI in context. Recent studies typically find that the correlation between 
FDI and economic development depends on the conditions in question. The conditions, often dubbed 
„threshold effects‟ in the studies, refer to the absorptive capacity of the domestic agents, in various 
forms including the stock of human capital, the level of infrastructural development, the capacity in 
innovation, the geographical proximity to economically dynamic localities, etc. (Huang et al. 2012, 
Madariaga and Poncet 2007, Qi et al. 2009). Thus, adequate analyses of the effects of FDI require 
taking into account the relevant characteristics of Chinese economic development – in particular, the 
relative importance of allocative and productive efficiency, in relation to the prevailing directions of 
structural and institutional changes. This requirement is logically linked to the structuralist and radical 
traditions in the boarder theoretical literature. Both traditions place emphasis on a range of additional 
factors that are considered to be crucial in determining the impact of FDI. Overlooking these concerns 
will lead to the loss of insights that could have been generated for understanding the reality.
3
 
 
3. FDI Flows and Chinese Economic Development: A First Look 
 
Immediate aggregate indicators do not fare well with the view that FDI has been an important driving 
force behind Chinese economic growth. In the first place, the standard neoclassical „prior-saving-
finances-investment‟ view, even if it is accepted at the conceptual level, does not have the empirical 
backing. As is shown in Figure 1, FDI flows as a ratio to China‟s GDP were almost negligible from 
1979 to 1991. Massive increases have occurred from 1992, but the ratio still averaged to no more than 
4% for the years until 2007. Put another way, FDI flows as a ratio to gross fixed capital formation 
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averaged to around 10% from 1992 to 2007. Given these magnitudes of the ratios, FDI flows could 
not account for a significant part of China‟ economic growth (all data henceforth are from Zhongguo 
Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], various issues, unless indicated otherwise).
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[Figure 1] 
 From the perspective of neoclassical economics, three points can be raised to posit that the 
above indicators could seriously understate the importance of FDI inflows for Chinese economic 
development. First, figures of FDI inflows do not reflect the full addition of FDI to capital formation, 
as there is also investment by foreign capital-invested enterprises (FIEs) using retained earnings. 
Second, the ratios of FDI inflows to GDP or capital formation do not capture the possible indirect 
investment crowding-in effect. Third, the ratios do not show the unobserved impact of FDI in raising 
the TFP of the economy.  
 At first sight, the argument concerning retained earnings seems reasonable enough. Official 
data, for the first time released in April 2011 by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, show 
that, by the end of year 2009, the stock of foreign direct investment in China amounted to US dollar 
997 billion, which was 27% more than that had been previously recorded. This upward adjustment 
was mainly because of two additional factors: foreign investors‟ share of retained earnings of FIEs, 
and foreign company headquarters‟ lending to their subsidiaries in China. This statistical redefinition 
also results in the upward adjustment of the data of FDI inflows. As can be seen from Table 1, for the 
years 2005-2010, the amount of inflows according to the new definition was typically double that of 
the previously released data, the latter being official data from the Ministry of Commerce and used in 
Figure 1. Nevertheless, the upward adjusted amounts of FDI inflows still stand at a rather modest ratio 
of GDP. In the peak year of 2005, the amount was 5.5% of GDP at official exchange rate, or 2.3% of 
GDP measured by purchasing power parity. Meanwhile, the retained earnings of FIEs for foreign 
investors are in domestic currency but, legally, are permitted to be repatriated in the form of foreign 
exchange. It is thus possible for retained earnings of this kind to become short-term speculative flows 
instead of long-term productive investment, as is suggested by the theory of the financialization of 
FDI reviewed in the previous section. There is indeed evidence that a significant proportion of these 
retained earnings have become „hot money‟ constantly in pursuit of short-term profits (Xu 2011). 
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[Table 1] 
 How about the argument on the investment crowd-in effect of FDI inflows? There are studies 
which have found that FDI inflows have been positively and significantly correlated with domestic 
investment growth, and this has been interpreted as evidence of the existence of an investment 
crowding-in effect (see, e.g., Luo 2007, Tang et al. 2008, Wu et al. 2012). There are also studies that 
come out with opposite findings. Braunstein and Epstein (2002), for instance, finds that FDI flows to 
China have tended to crowd-out domestic investment at the provincial level. But most importantly, 
virtually all of these are disaggregate studies, and it is well-known that FDI has tended to flow to 
locations that are with sufficient prior investment in infrastructure and other related facilities (see, e.g., 
Berthélemy and Démurger 2000, Huang et al. 2012). It is thus likely that the relationship between FDI 
inflows and domestic investment is two-way rather than one-way causation, notwithstanding the 
findings of some existing studies that have sought to test the causality in a purely statistical sense. 
There remains the third argument, regarding the possible contribution of FDI to TFP growth. 
This is the focus of the existing literature. Some studies emphasize the availability of additional 
foreign exchange following FDI flows. And foreign exchange is deemed important because it could 
be used to finance technology imports, not least in the embodied form of machinery and/or industrial 
inputs. Other studies emphasize the contribution of FDI to TFP growth by improving the efficiency of 
FDI-receiving firms, industries and regions. And the mechanisms through which this contribution 
takes effect include technology transfer, and the promotion of economic institutional and structural 
changes (OECD 2002, World Bank 2006). These studies have been reviewed in the previous section. 
It is particularly of note that the emphasis on technology transfer and efficiency promotion has been 
incorporated into the body of studies on productivity spillovers mostly at the micro level. We shall 
look at the evidence at the regional and sectoral levels in the next section.
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Consider the issue of foreign exchange. It is true that FDI represents the availability of 
additional foreign exchange at the time of the flows. Yet, FDI is not the same as international aids; 
FDI needs pay off, or to be repaid over the long term. Without the necessary data of profit repatriation 
and re-investment by FIEs, it is not possible as yet to ascertain the magnitude of the contribution of 
FDI to China‟s long-term economic growth in this regard. Regardless the existence or otherwise of 
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repatriation, because retained earnings are in Chinese Yuan but can be converted into foreign 
currencies at any time, they cannot be considered as a contribution to foreign exchange availability for 
China. It is thus possible to present, as an approximation, the total contribution of foreign exchange 
availability by FDI inflows in the form of Table 2. 
In Table 2, the total contribution of FDI to foreign exchange availability (T) is the sum of 
three items: investment earnings that flow out of China (F) which are a negative contribution, new 
FDI inflows (If), and foreign trade surplus of FIEs (B). By the column T, we see that ever since 1992, 
FDI has been making positive contribution to foreign exchange availability in China. However, in 
most of the years before 1990 when China ran a deficit in trade balance (see Table 3 below), FDI 
contributed negatively to China‟s foreign exchange availability. RC denotes the change in official 
reserves. The difference, RC-T, indicates what the change in official reserves would have been in the 
absence of the contribution of FDI. We see that in years 1992-1993 and 1998-2000, FDI made 
positive contribution to the availability of foreign exchange for China and, meanwhile, the official 
reserves would have decreased in the absence of FDI. In those years when foreign exchange was a 
scarce resource, FDI was indeed helpful by increasing China‟s availability of foreign exchange (when 
T>0). The trend changed in recent years. FDI still contributes substantially to the increase in China‟s 
official reserves, but the reserves would increase anyhow even without the contribution of FDI. Given 
the evidence of the huge social costs and risks brought about by „excessive‟ accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves in developing countries, especially in China (see, e.g., Frankel 2005, Rodrik 2006, 
and Zheng and Yi 2007), it is difficult to conclude that FDI has significantly contributed to Chinese 
economic development via contribution to foreign exchange availability. 
[Table 2] 
Some existing studies have highlighted the contribution of FDI to export earnings as of 
central importance. It is found that FDI inflows have been strongly correlated with export expansion – 
although the direction of causation appears to be two-way instead of one-way (Liu et al. 2002). It is 
also found that FIEs have become a main impetus behind the expansion of China‟s total exports, with 
exports carried out by non-FIEs tending to stagnate (Whalley and Xin 2010) – although there remains 
the question as to in what measure have FIEs been in competition with domestic firms for China‟s 
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exportable goods. Even if the questions concerning causation and the competition for exportable 
goods are put aside, it is an exaggeration to infer from existing data that FIEs have largely contributed 
to the expansion of export earnings. True, FIEs have accounted for a rapidly expanding share of 
China‟s total exports, exceeding 40% from 1996 and 50% from 2001. Yet, as can be seen from Table 
3, it is also true that FIEs have accounted for an even larger share of total imports. For 13 years from 
1985 to 1997, FIEs ran a sizeable trade deficit every year, in contrast to China‟s overall trade surplus 
for most years after 1989. And, although FIEs have enjoyed trade surplus every year from 1998, such 
surplus had until 2005 accounted for a minor part of the national total. Parts of the imports by FIEs 
are production equipment which they bring along with investment. The possible contribution to TFP 
growth in this regard then comes down to two forms: technology transfer to FDI-receiving firms 
which use the imported equipment, and the potential for FIEs to become important net exporters in the 
long term – the latter possibility, as noted, did not really materialize until recent years. 
[Table 3] 
 Now, consider possible contribution of FDI to TFP growth by means of improving the 
efficiency of the economy. Mainstream theories postulate that this could take effect in various forms: 
technology transfer to FDI-receiving firms, spill-over effects on other firms of the same industries 
and/or linked industries, the promotion of structural change of the economy in the direction of 
following its „endowed‟ comparative advantage, the promotion of institutional change in the direction 
of following principles of the market, etc. Whether or not these theoretical views are valid, and 
whether or not some or all of such benefits are present, the net effect is likely to show up mainly in 
the performance of the entire sector of FIEs relative to the rest of Chinese industry. 
 Figure 2 shows the productivity performance of FIEs relative to Chinese industrial enterprises 
as a whole. Note first the relative labour productivity series, which exhibits a trend of secular decline 
from 1993 to 2007. On the face of it, this trend is consistent with both the neoclassical thesis of 
structural change towards China‟s endowment-determined comparative advantage – that is, taking 
advantage of the existing „cheap labour‟ (labour abundance) in China – as well as the radical thesis of 
deskilling. In other words, it is quite possible that the trend embodies improving allocative efficiency 
and/or worsening productive efficiency. It is thus necessary to turn to look at the indicator of overall 
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efficiency performance, represented by the evolution of the relative TFP series. Again, the relative 
TFP series exhibits basically the same trend of secular decline, amid the massive expansion of FDI 
inflows and of the sector of FIEs over the period 1993-2007. This suggests that the productive 
efficiency loss has dominated the allocative efficiency gains, which is hardly supportive to a positive 
assessment of the contribution of FIEs to China‟s economic development. 
[Figure 2] 
If its relative efficiency has been actually falling, why has the sector of FIEs expanded rapidly 
in terms of its share in Chinese industry? To answer this question requires investigation into the 
decision-making of FDI flows, but it is likely that the answer lies in the respect of labour 
compensation. As is well-known, because of the effectively unlimited supply of immigrant workers, 
wage rates in most of China‟s labour-intensive, export-oriented FIEs remained basically unchanged at 
low levels up until recent years. Figure 2 shows that the average wage rate of FIEs, relative to all 
Chinese industrial enterprises, followed a trend of decline. And the relative average wage rate curve is 
below the relative labour productivity and relative TFP curves in many of the years. Given this 
condition, it might have still been profitable for FIEs despite their deteriorating trends of relative 
labour productivity and TFP. But the trends themselves imply that, for Chinese industry as a whole, 
the development associated with the expansion of the sector of FIEs cannot be judged as efficient.
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4. The Effects of Foreign Capital-Invested Enterprises: Sectoral-Regional Analyses 
 
The discussion in the preceding section concerns the role of FDI inflows, and the entire sector of 
FIEs, in Chinese economic development. It will be of insight to carry forward the discussion by 
analysing the economic performance – relative to national average – of industrial sectors and 
provinces that are with an above-average level of presence of FIEs. For, the indicator of the industrial 
value-added share of FIEs in a particular sector or province in a year shows the accumulated 
penetration of FDI inflows in that sector/province from the beginning up until that year. The analysis 
of the relationship between this indicator and the relative performance of the sector/province in 
question will thus in a way help to verify the mainstream hypothesis of FDI improving efficiency, via 
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technology transfer/spillover and institutional/structural change, as well as the structuralist hypothesis 
of FDI worsening efficiency via distorting/killing domestic industries and the radical hypothesis of 
deskilling. This section is thus devoted to sectoral-provincial analysis, with a view of taking on the 
existing literature for comparison purpose. 
 Table 4 presents the relevant data of the 35 sectors of Chinese industry, for the year 1991 and 
2007. The reason for selecting 1991 as the beginning point is that this was the year immediately prior 
to the massive expansion of FDI inflows, as has been shown in Figure 1. And 2007 is the last year 
before the global financial crisis and economic recession struck. The reason for selecting the latest 
year before the 2008 world crisis, as mentioned, is that the indicator of the industrial value-added 
share of FIEs reflects the cumulative effects of FDI flows and FIEs operations in each of the particular 
sectors over the previous years. Looking at the data of sectors that are with an above-average level of 
industrial value-added share of FIEs, three points are of note from the table. 
[Table 4] 
 The first point concerns the sectoral distribution of FIEs in relation to the production 
characteristics of industries. Theoretically, both the mainstream theory of comparative advantage and 
the radical theory of the „new international division of labour‟ would expect the market-oriented FIEs 
to tend to concentrate in China‟s labour-intensive industries. This is basically true in reality. As is 
customary in the literature of trade analysis, industries that are with relative labour productivity lower 
than the value of 0.9 are usually classified as labour intensive. On this count, of the 18 industrial 
sectors that are with an above-average level of penetration of FIEs in 2007, a majority of 11 sectors 
could be classified as labour intensive both in that year and in 1991. 
 The second point concerns the impact of FDI on the labour productivity of Chinese industry. 
The mainstream theory would expect the FIEs-dominated sectors to tend to have slower-than-average 
growth in labour productivity, reflecting their adoption of production techniques that are with a 
higher-than-average labour intensity. Again, this is basically true in reality. Of the 18 industrial 
sectors in question, 14 sectors experienced a negative growth in relative labour productivity between 
1991 and 2007. This performance is consistent with the expectation of improving allocative 
efficiency. Yet, the performance is also consistent with the radical thesis of deskilling, which argues 
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that FIEs – and, by extension, FIEs-dominated sectors – would tend to retard the economy-wide trend 
of improving labour productivity. 
 The third point concerns the total impact of FDI on the efficiency of Chinese industry, which 
is reflected in the relative TFP performance of FIEs-dominated sectors. Note that, because the 
indicator is TFP relative to Chinese industry as a whole, it excludes the effect of economy-wide 
factors and highlights the effect of sector-specific factors including the above-average level of 
presence of FIEs. And the indicator could in principle capture the impact of technology transfer, 
horizontal or intra-sector spillover, the enhancement of market institutions in these sectors, etc. The 
results in Table 4 are quite in contrast to the mainstream of the literature: of the 18 FIEs-dominated 
industrial sectors, 14 sectors had a negative growth in relative TFP between 1991 and 2007. It appears 
that, insomuch as there does exist the positive impact of FDI on the efficiency of Chinese industry as 
postulated by neoclassical economics, this has hitherto been dominated by the negative impact as 
postulated by the structuralist and radical theories. 
 Table 5 presents the relevant industrial data of the 30 province-level regions of China, again 
for the year 1991 and 2007. It is of note the high degree of spatial concentration of FIEs in China: 
there are only eight regions – Guangdong, Shanghai, Fujian, Tianjin, Hainan, Jiangsu, Beijing, and 
Jilin – that are with an above-average level of industrial value-added share of FIEs in 2007. In this 
circumstance, the performance of the eight regions in question is somewhat different from the result 
of sectoral analysis. Judging from the criterion of relative labour productivity, only one (Jilin) of the 
industries of the eight regions could be classified as labour-intensive in 1991. By 2007, two 
(Guangdong and Fujian) out of the eight became labour-intensive. Given the exceptionally high 
value-added share of FIEs in the two regions, it might still be possible to say that FIEs have to some 
extent followed the principle of endowment-determined comparative advantage with respect to spatial 
distribution. Meanwhile, the same is also basically true concerning the impact of FIEs on allocative 
efficiency: four (Guangdong, Shanghai, Fujian, and Beijing) out of the eight regions exhibited a 
negative growth in relative labour productivity between 1991 and 2007. And it is precisely these four 
regions, together with Jiangsu province, that have also experienced a negative growth of relative TFP 
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from 1991 to 2007. Thus, it seems clear that the analysis of regional data has produced a result that is 
broadly similar to that from the analysis of sectoral data. 
[Table 5] 
 The sectoral-regional analyses associated with Table 4 and Table 5 appear to indicate that 
FDI does have the kind of impact as suggested by neoclassical economics, but it is not true that the 
impact results in a positive and strong contribution to the overall efficiency of Chinese industry. The 
analytical findings are consistent with the view that FDI flows, and FIEs operations, have helped to 
improve the allocative efficiency of the industrial sectors and regions. Yet, the findings are also 
consistent with the alternative views that FIEs operations could result in retarding labour productivity 
growth as well as distorting the industrial structure of the sectors/regions in question. The negative 
growth in relative TFP for most of the FIEs-dominated sectors and regions suggests that this negative 
impact has hitherto dominated the positive impact in the Chinese experience. 
To bring our sectoral-regional analyses of the role of FDI in Chinese economic development 
to a close, it will be useful to make further use of the data in Tables 4 and Table 5 for carrying out 
statistical tests. For, the analyses above only look at the FIEs-dominated sectors/regions instead of the 
full set of data. This might be somewhat too narrow a focus with respect to the general picture of FIEs 
in the Chinese economy. Meanwhile, in another respect, the analyses might also be too general: in 
accounting for the performance of efficiency of the sectors/regions, the analyses do not single out the 
above-average level of presence of FIEs from other sector- or region-specific factors. These two 
shortcomings could be mitigated by using the full set of data for statistical tests. Specifically, it could 
be hypothesized that the level of industrial total factor productivity (A) of a sector, or of a province, is 
determined by the total scale of that sector/province as represented by its total value-added (V) and the 
value-added share of FIEs in that sector/province (Vf/V), that is,  
lnA = a + blnV + c(Vf/V) 
In two respects, the analyses of applying the above formulation can be useful. First, using V 
as an explanatory variable of A implies that the analyses take into account the growth paths of the 
sectors/provinces – that is, the existence or otherwise of economies of scale or agglomeration. Second, 
in the cross-regional comparison, the analysis can help to verify the effects brought about by FDI of 
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inter-sectoral technological spillover as well as structural and institutional changes. This is because 
such spillovers and changes are likely to take effect mainly within the boundary of a province. 
Finally, it should be recalled that the variable Vf/V captures the accumulated penetration of FIEs in a 
particular sector/province. Doing a cross-sectional analysis on the one-year data of 2007 would thus 
provide information for inferring the accumulated impact of FDI on Chinese industry. 
[Table 6] 
 Table 6 shows the results of the cross-sectoral and cross-regional regression analyses. It can 
be seen that, in both cases, the estimated value of the coefficient of V is statistically significantly 
positive. Yet, conceptually, the existence or otherwise of economies of scale or agglomeration in 
industrial development is determined by a multiple of factors that are mainly exogenous to FDI. The 
above analytical result thus suggests that, to the extent that FDI has contributed to the productivity 
improvement of Chinese industry, this is likely to be a process of two-way instead of uni-directional 
causation. Meanwhile, it can be seen further from Table 6 that the estimated value of the coefficient of 
Vf/V is statistically significantly negative in the case of cross-sectoral analysis and statistically 
insignificant in the case of cross-regional analysis. This result is consistent with the inference above 
from Figure 2 that the contribution to Chinese industrial development by the expansion of FIEs, and 
their increasing penetration level, has tended to be insignificant or even negative. This is the case even 
if one takes into account the indirect impact of inter-sectoral technological spillover and overall 
structural and institutional changes, as is evident in the result of cross-regional analysis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The mainstream of existing studies on the role of FDI in Chinese economic development has mostly 
followed the analytics of neoclassical economics. They tend to see FDI as embodying a net addition in 
financial, technological and/or institutional resources for recipient economies. Their assessment of the 
role of FDI in China has tended to be strongly positive. Yet, this theoretical view might be too 
narrowly focused, and the judgement from the applied analyses might be problematic. A range of 
alternative theories rather see the nature of FDI as more than the availability of new resources, and 
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argue that FDI flows could bring about negative impact on economic development. The body of 
studies on productivity spillovers, which focuses on micro-level analyses and does not a priori take 
the neoclassical view that FDI can only positively affect economic development, represents a 
deviation from the mainstream. Their analytical findings reveal that, in the Chinese case, there have 
been indeed both positive and negative effects brought about by FDI. 
  The objective of this paper is to study the subject matter in the light of the broader theoretical 
literature on FDI and late development, focusing on both the aggregate and sectoral levels. Its main 
analytical finding is that FDI in China has indeed promoted economic development in one respect 
(improving allocative efficiency), but has had unfavourable effect in another respect (worsening 
productive efficiency), resulting in an overall impact that tends to be on the negative side. These 
findings are broadly consistent with the micro-level analyses of the studies on productivity spillovers. 
The mainstream story of China is thus judged to be partial, and the lessons to be drawn from the 
experience are arguably far more complex than have been hitherto perceived. 
 Before closing the paper, it will be useful to briefly discuss the new lights cast by the world 
economic situation post-2008 on the implications of FDI flows to China. There are two important, 
inter-related points in this connection. The first is empirical, concerning the role of China in the so-
called „global imbalances‟. The symptom is that, since the early years of the new century, China has 
registered a massive current-account surplus – amid the United States registering a massive current-
account deficit. Commentators, including top officials of the US government, have thus held China 
responsible for causing (via the alleged „global savings glut‟) the financial crisis and prolonging the 
world recession. Whether or not this accusation has any validity is a matter of debate. From the 
perspective of this paper, it is of note the role of FDI in the generation of China‟s external surplus. 
Recall from our analyses in Section Three: it is precisely since the early years of the new century that 
the trade surplus of FIEs has accounted for a rapidly increasing share of China‟s total trade surplus, 
from 23% in 2002 (the first year of China‟s WTO accession) to 58% in 2008. 
 The second point of note is intellectual. Recall the literature review in Section Two, where it 
was indicated that of the three theoretical traditions only radical political economy envisages – in the 
proposition of the internationalization of capital – the possibility of FDI worsening global demand 
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deficiency over the long term.  The „global imbalances‟, or at least China‟s sizeable external surplus 
following the massive inflows of FDI post WTO-accession, might be a vindication of this proposition. 
Whether or not this is the case, the international friction caused by the expansion of China‟s external 
surplus implies that the availability of increased export earnings – a central proposition of the 
mainstream view on FDI – is not necessarily always beneficial. The further phenomenon of the 
alleged „global savings glut‟, or at least China‟s situation of savings persistently and substantially 
exceeding investment post WTO-accession, also turns on the head of the orthodox proposition that the 
availability of additional, foreign savings brought about by FDI inflows is an unquestionable blessing. 
All these add further complexities to the policy lessons from the Chinese experience of utilizing FDI 
for economic development, and warn against simple-minded policy recommendations (typical of the 
mainstream of existing studies) of attracting as much FDI inflows as possible. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. This paper focuses on issues of allocative and productive efficiency in China‟s nexus of FDI and 
economic development. Due to limitation of space, we shall not carry out applied analyses at the 
financial and macroeconomic levels. The review in this paragraph and the comment towards the 
end of the paper only serve to highlight the importance of the financial and macroeconomic issues. 
As far as we know, the existing literature has not provided any study on these issues. 
2. These cited works all adhere to the neoclassical propositions that FDI represent the availability of 
additional financial resources and foreign exchange, as well as a driving force for efficiency 
improvement. Outside the mainstream, scholars such as Dullien (2005) and Sun (2003) recognise 
early on that, theoretically, FDI could also bring about negative effects à la the structuralist 
propositions – although their actual analyses of the Chinese experiences still mainly confine to 
testing the three neoclassical propositions, and they tend to conclude that these propositions are 
broadly valid in the Chinese experience. 
3. The emphasis here, with respect to the importance of putting the analyses of the effects of FDI in 
context, is a general statement. It needs concrete contents in relation to the specific analyses of 
existing studies. Due to limitation of space, it is not possible in this paper to attempt to summarise 
the main characteristics of Chinese economic transformation over the period under study. What 
we can do is to highlight the following three points that are deemed directly relevant to the subject 
matter of the paper. First, it is an established stylised fact that China‟s economic growth since the 
mid-1990s has followed an investment-led, or capital-deepening path. There is evidence that this 
path embodies strong properties of productive efficiency, in the form of dynamic increasing 
returns, and large-scale capital-intensive industries have benefitted most from this growth path 
(Lo and Li 2011). Productivity growth has thus been very fast: measured by the real growth of 
per-worker GDP, the average annual rate was 9.69% in the period 1990-2007. Second, before its 
entry to the World Trade Organisation (and the enforcement of the principle of non-discrimination) 
in late 2001, China‟s policy-institutional regime governing the utilization of FDI exhibited a 
spatially diverse but progressively converging pattern. The Special Economic Zones set up in the 
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early reform years (four in 1979-1980, one more in 1985) enjoyed a far more liberal regime than 
the rest of the coastal regions. The same was true for the coastal regions as a whole vis-à-vis the 
inland and western provinces. Thus, at least before 2001, the spatial distribution of FDI and its 
impact on local economic development were not entirely the outcome of competitive market 
activities. This is a tricky issue that has rarely been taken into account by the analyses in existing 
studies. Third, in the sectoral-regional analyses below in section four, we use indicators of relative 
productivity as measurements of performance. This is meant to highlight the effects of sector- or 
region-specific factors including the impact of FDI. We also use, as explanatory factors, indicators 
that capture the accumulated penetration of FDI in the sectors or regions in question. This way, 
the above two points can be, to some extent, taken into account in our analyses. 
4. FDI data are from Ministry of Commerce, not Balance of Payment (BoP) records. The difference 
between the two series is that, from year 2005, the BoP series include two additional items: first, 
foreign investors‟ share of retained earnings of FIEs, and, second, foreign company headquarters‟ 
lending to their subsidiaries in China (we discuss the importance of these below). Consistent BoP 
data before 2005 are not available. Meanwhile, the FDI-to-GDP ratios in Figure 1 are calculated 
by converting FDI data from US dollar to Chinese Yuan at the official exchange rate. Using 
purchasing power parity (PPP) measures of GDP will substantially adjust down the ratios, and 
will strengthen our argument that FDI flows cannot be considered as very important in accounting 
for the growth of capital formation. According to the World Bank estimates of Chinese GDP at 
PPP, the ratios varied from the lowest level of 0.35% in 1990 to the peak level of 2.10% in 1994. 
The ratio so measured was 1.04% in 2010. Note that, unlike GDP, there does not exist PPP 
estimates of China‟s gross fixed capital formation. 
5. TFP is a controversial concept both theoretically and in applied analysis (Felipe and McCombie 
2010, Temple 2010). In the context of applied analysis of Chinese economic development at the 
disaggregate levels (firm, sector, and region), there are considerations that could undermine the 
usefulness of the concept. One consideration concerns data. Labour input is typically measured in 
the number of employees, instead of number of working hours. This implies that firms with a 
comparatively faster pace of increasing (or slower pace of decreasing) work intensity, defined in 
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terms of working hours per year, will tend to exhibit faster TFP growth. Capital input is typically 
proxied by the official data of the net value of fixed assets, without taking care of the fact that, as 
a legacy of the pre-reform system, the rate of depreciation has been set exceedingly low. This 
implies that firms that are comparatively new will tend to exhibit faster TFP growth. Both of these 
measurement problems of data will tend to favour FIEs, vis-à-vis other firms, in the estimation of 
TFP growth. All these notwithstanding, we continue to use the concept in this paper as a tactic of 
engaging with the existing literature: if it is found that FIEs have been actually outperformed by 
the rest of Chinese industry, on the basis of an analytics that is already in favour of FIEs, further 
doubt will be cast on the mainstream claim over their comparative efficiency. On top of this, for 
want of more appropriate analytics, we believe the sectoral-regional analyses of TFP performance 
might still be of value for understanding Chinese economic development. 
6. It might be useful also to briefly discuss the contribution of FDI inflows to employment creation, 
which has been widely viewed as a significant benefit to China. FDI does create jobs, especially 
because FIEs tend to concentrate in labour-intensive sectors. But there are two qualifications. First, 
job creation needs to be seen in conjunction with labour compensation, especially in the light of 
the secular trend of falling relative wage rates of FIEs indicated in Figure 2. The widespread 
phenomena of labour shortage in labour-intensive, export-oriented industries in coastal China 
since 2005, and the waves of labour unrest in these industries since 2009, indicate the limit to the 
labour absorption capacity of FIEs based on the wage rates they offer. Second, the presumption 
that a labour-intensive path of economic growth – which FIEs have helped to promote (see section 
four) – must create more jobs than a capital-intensive one, does not have a sufficient theoretical 
basis. In line with the famous Feldman-Mahalanobis-Domar model, a capital-deepening growth 
path can be characterized by faster productivity growth and capital accumulation – and thus 
possibly a stronger capacity to create jobs. As indicated in Footnote 3, there is good evidence that 
Chinese economic growth since the early 1990s has followed a capital-deepening path, and has 
registered fast productivity growth and capital accumulation. Issues of labour employment, and 
the role of FDI thereof, should be explicitly analysed in this context.  
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Figure 1. The scale of FDI flows to China 
 
Sources:  1979-82 figures of FDI flows from Chen et al. (1995); all others from Zhongguo Tongji 
Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] 2015. 
Notes: FDI data are measured by the Ministry of Commerce definition, not from Balance of Payment 
records. In calculating the FDI/GDP ratios, FDI figures are converted into Chinese currency at 
the year-average official exchange rates. 
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Table 1. FDI inflows as ratio to GDP (%) 
 
FDI (Ministry of Commerce definition) FDI (Balance of Payment definition) 
 
as % of GDP 
(exchange rate) 
as % of GDP 
(PPP) 
as % of GDP 
(exchange rate) 
as % of GDP 
(PPP) 
2005 2.66% 1.12% 5.45% 2.29% 
2006 2.31% 1.00% 4.86% 2.11% 
2007 2.12% 1.01% 4.86% 2.30% 
2008 2.03% 1.11% 4.13% 2.27% 
2009 1.78% 0.97% 2.89% 1.58% 
2010 1.75% 1.02% 3.42% 1.99% 
Sources: FDI (Ministry of Commerce definition) and GDP (measured at market exchange 
rate) data from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues; FDI (Balance of Payment 
definition) data from State Administration of Foreign Exchange website; GDP 
(measured at purchasing power parity) data from World Bank World Development 
Indicators. 
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Table 2. Contribution of FDI inflows to foreign exchange availability (US$ 100m) 
 
 
Investment 
Earnings  
(F)  
Net FDI 
inflows 
(If) 
Balance of 
foreign trade 
of FIEs (B) 
Total contribution of 
FDI to foreign 
exchange availability 
(T = F + If + B) 
Change in 
Official 
reserve 
(RC)  RC-T 
1985 0 17 -18 -1 -25 -24 
1986 0 19 -21 -2 -14 -12 
1987 0 23 -22 1 47 46 
1988 0 32 -34 -2 23 25 
1989 0 34 -39 -5 -5 0 
1990 0 35 -45 -11 116 126 
1991 0 44 -46 -2 141 143 
1992 0 112 -38 73 -23 -96 
1993 -2 275 -166 107 18 -89 
1994 -4 338 -182 152 304 152 
1995 -100 358 -161 98 220 122 
1996 -117 402 -141 144 314 170 
1997 -167 442 -28 247 349 101 
1998 -220 438 42 259 51 -209 
1999 -223 388 27 192 97 -95 
2000 -265 384 22 141 109 -32 
2001 -277 442 74 239 466 227 
2002 -223 493 69 339 742 404 
2003 -228 471 84 327 1168 842 
2004 -227 549 141 464 2067 1603 
2005 -532 1172 567 1207 2526 1319 
2006 -577 1241 913 1577 2853 1276 
2007 -727 1601 1356 2230 4609 2379 
2008 -812 1751 1707 2646 4783 2137 
2009 -993 1142 1267 1416 3821 2405 
2010 -1128 1851 1238 1961 4696 2735 
Sources: F, If and RC are from BoP Tables of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
website; the other data are from Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical 
Yearbook], various issues. 
Note:    The figures in some of the years do not exactly add up due to rounding. 
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Table 3. Exports and imports of foreign capital-invested enterprises (FIEs) 
 Exports Imports Balance Balance of China‟s 
 Amount 
(US$ 100m) 
as % of 
total 
Amount 
(US$ 100m) 
as % of 
total 
(US$ 100m) Total foreign trade 
(US$ 100m) 
1985 3 1.10% 21 4.97% -18 -149 
1986 5 1.62% 26 6.06% -21 -120 
1987 12 3.04% 34 7.87% -22 -38 
1988 25 5.26% 59 10.67% -34 -78 
1989 49 9.35% 88 14.88% -39 -66 
1990 78 12.59% 123 23.09% -45 87 
1991 123 17.12% 169 26.56% -46 81 
1992 174 20.44% 211 26.23% -38 44 
1993 252 27.51% 418 40.24% -166 -122 
1994 347 28.68% 529 45.78% -182 54 
1995 469 31.51% 629 47.66% -161 167 
1996 615 40.72% 756 54.46% -141 122 
1997 749 40.98% 777 54.59% -28 404 
1998 810 44.07% 767 54.70% 42 435 
1999 886 45.47% 859 51.83% 27 292 
2000 1194 47.93% 1173 52.10% 22 241 
2001 1332 50.06% 1259 51.67% 74 225 
2002 1693 52.00% 1624 55.00% 69 304 
2003 2403 54.84% 2319 56.17% 84 255 
2004 3386 57.07% 3244 57.81% 141 321 
2005 4442 58.30% 3875 58.71% 567 1020 
2006 5638 58.19% 4725 59.70% 913 1775 
2007 6954 57.10% 5598 58.56% 1356 2618 
2008 7906 55.26% 6200 54.74% 1707 2981 
2009 6721 55.93% 5454 54.22% 1267 1957 
2010 8622 54.65% 7384 52.88% 1238 1815 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] and Zhongguo Tongji 
Zhaoyao [China Statistical Abstract], various issues; Wang Luolin (ed.) (1997) Report 
on Foreign Direct Investment in China, Beijing, Economic Science Press. 
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Figure 2. Relative labour productivity, total factor productivity and wage rate of FIEs, 
 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2008 [China Statistical Yearbook 2008]. 
Notes:   V = industrial value added (current prices, 100 million yuan); L = labour employment (year 
average, 10,000 persons); K = Value of fixed-assets net of depreciation (year average, 100 
million yuan); V/L = labour productivity (yuan per worker); A = V/[(L
0.6
)(K
0.4
)] = total factor 
productivity; W = average wage rate. Figures with no subscript refer to all industrial 
enterprises; those with subscript “f” refer to FIEs. The category “all industrial enterprises” 
refers to “township-and-above independently accounting industrial enterprises” before 1998, 
and “all state-owned industrial enterprises and above-scale non-state-owned industrial 
enterprises” from 1998. The same definitions apply to Tables 4, 5 and 6 below. 
 Note that the wage rate (W and Wf) data cover all “formal employees” (chengzhen zhigong) 
of both industrial and non-industrial firms. Compared to the V, K, and L data, the coverage of 
the wage rate data is thus narrower in one respect (it does not cover “informal employees”) 
but wider in another respect (it covers employees of both industrial and non-industrial firms). 
These two set of data are thus not strictly comparable. Putting the relative efficiency (labour 
productivity and TFP) data and the relative wage data together in this same graph is no more 
than trying to indicate the trends of development. 
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Table 4. Relative productivity performance of industry by sectors, 2007 
 Vf/V (Vs/Ls)/(V/L) As/A 
 2007 1991 2007 change 1991 2007 change 
National Total 27.45% 1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  
Communication equipment, computers 
and other electronic equipment 76.48% 1.4146  0.9069  -0.5077  1.4198  1.0797  -0.3401  
Culture, educational and sports articles 60.88% 0.8044  0.3127  -0.4917  1.1859  0.5994  -0.5865  
Measuring instruments and cultural and 
office machines 56.25% 0.8308  0.7317  -0.0991  1.0663  1.0667  0.0004  
Leather, fur, feather and related products 50.63% 0.6784  0.3876  -0.2908  0.9685  0.8074  -0.1611  
Transport equipment 48.16% 1.0247  1.1485  0.1238  1.1364  1.2121  0.0756  
Apparel, footwear and hats 47.45% 0.6788  0.3679  -0.3108  1.0891  0.7226  -0.3665  
Furniture 43.20% 0.5219  0.4766  -0.0453  0.7880  0.7295  -0.0586  
Artwork and other manufactures 40.52% 0.6326  0.4508  -0.1818  1.0338  0.7816  -0.2522  
Plastic products 39.97% 0.8734  0.6418  -0.2317  0.9738  0.8389  -0.1350  
Electrical machines and equipment 36.06% 1.1382  0.9068  -0.2314  1.3429  1.2376  -0.1053  
Beverage manufacturing 35.84% 1.5361  1.2546  -0.2816  1.4182  1.2557  -0.1625  
Rubber products 35.05% 1.2450  0.7373  -0.5077  1.5347  0.8326  -0.7020  
Paper and paper products 33.54% 0.7896  0.8480  0.0584  0.8893  0.7920  -0.0973  
Metal products 33.26% 0.7432  0.7406  -0.0026  1.0337  1.0269  -0.0068  
Printing and recording media 31.51% 0.7493  0.6432  -0.1061  0.9538  0.7351  -0.2188  
Chemical fibres 31.36% 2.7812  1.2022  -1.5790  1.8023  0.9510  -0.8513  
Food manufacturing and processing 29.64% 0.9331  1.0945  0.1613  0.9659  1.2832  0.3173  
Raw chemicals and chemical products 29.11% 1.2647  1.2987  0.0341  1.1425  1.1461  0.0036  
Medicines 27.30% 1.8511  1.1202  -0.7309  1.8491  1.1501  -0.6990  
General and special-purpose machines 26.66% 0.7678  0.8122  0.0444  0.9393  1.0541  0.1148  
Textile 24.12% 0.7065  0.5279  -0.1786  0.8426  0.7094  -0.1332  
Non-metallic mineral products 18.66% 0.6355  0.7276  0.0921  0.7646  0.8013  0.0367  
Timber, wood, bamboo, rattan, palm, and 
straw products 18.06% 0.5698  0.6528  0.0830  0.6913  0.9067  0.2154  
Water production and distribution 16.56% 1.1948  0.5953  -0.5995  0.7016  0.3815  -0.3201  
Petroleum processing, coking, and 
nuclear fuel processing 15.10% 3.0565  2.5839  -0.4726  1.8418  1.7263  -0.1155  
Non-ferrous metals Smelting and Pressing 14.73% 1.4039  1.9278  0.5239  1.1555  1.6956  0.5401  
Ferrous metals smelting and pressing 11.89% 1.5618  1.9907  0.4288  1.2109  1.4717  0.2608  
Electric power and heat power production 
and distribution 9.67% 2.1328  2.3117  0.1789  1.0753  1.0245  -0.0507  
Petroleum and natural gas extraction 8.50% 4.1111  4.7868  0.6758  1.8657  2.8065  0.9409  
Non-metal ores mining and processing 8.26% 0.5172  0.7465  0.2293  0.7163  0.9831  0.2668  
Non-ferrous metal ores mining and processing 3.80% 0.7105  1.1883  0.4778  0.7235  1.4894  0.7659  
Ferrous metal ores mining and processing 2.75% 0.6723  1.2717  0.5994  0.7375  1.4633  0.7258  
Coal mining and washing 1.54% 0.3870  0.6814  0.2944  0.4043  0.7944  0.3901  
Other ores mining and processing 0.92% 0.5237  0.8462  0.3225  0.8539  1.1682  0.3143  
Tobacco 0.15% 13.7209  10.5525  -3.1683  9.7445  7.7289  -2.0157  
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] and Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji Nianjian 
  [Statistical Yearbook of China‟s Industrial Economy], various issues. 
Note:    V = industrial value added; L = labour employment; K = Value of fixed-assets net of depreciation; V/L 
= labour productivity; A = V/[(L
0.6
)(K
0.4
)] = total factor productivity. Figures with no subscript refer to 
all enterprises; those with subscript “f” and “s” refer to FIEs and the sector in question, respectively. 
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Table 5. Relative productivity performance of industry by provinces, 2007 
 Vf/V (Vs/Ls)/(V/L) As/A 
 2007 1991 2007 Change 1991 2007 change 
National total 27.45% 1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  1.0000  1.0000  0.0000  
Guangdong 58.54% 1.5763  0.7258  -0.8504  1.4167  0.8961  -0.5206  
Shanghai 57.25% 1.6980  1.3103  -0.3878  1.5365  1.1302  -0.4063  
Fujian 51.96% 1.0716  0.6741  -0.3975  1.1361  0.8268  -0.3093  
Tianjin 44.60% 1.1450  1.6451  0.5001  1.1243  1.4343  0.3101  
Hainan 41.84% 1.0310  1.5257  0.4947  0.8665  1.0504  0.1839  
Jiangsu 40.67% 0.9380  1.0101  0.0721  1.0532  1.0298  -0.0234  
Beijing 37.06% 1.5597  1.2184  -0.3414  1.4185  0.9577  -0.4608  
Jilin 28.39% 0.7739  1.2799  0.5060  0.7767  1.1159  0.3392  
Zhejiang 26.33% 0.9925  0.6441  -0.3484  1.1835  0.7330  -0.4505  
Hubei 22.66% 0.8719  1.0956  0.2236  0.9063  0.9029  -0.0033  
Liaoning 21.97% 0.9189  1.1063  0.1874  0.8854  1.0253  0.1399  
Guangxi 20.38% 1.0552  1.0272  -0.0281  1.0519  0.9561  -0.0958  
Shandong 19.29% 1.0918  1.1972  0.1054  1.0078  1.2234  0.2157  
Hebei 17.46% 0.8237  1.0702  0.2465  0.7947  1.0293  0.2346  
Jiangxi 15.37% 0.6600  0.8712  0.2112  0.7794  0.9365  0.1572  
Anhui 14.73% 0.6977  0.9675  0.2698  0.7779  0.9644  0.1865  
Sichuan-Chongqing 11.72% 0.7837  0.9943  0.2107  0.8544  0.9941  0.1397  
Tibet 9.25% 0.8363  0.7814  -0.0549  0.6440  0.5226  -0.1214  
Inner Mongolia 7.64% 0.7248  1.8278  1.1030  0.7098  1.3231  0.6133  
Hunan 7.61% 0.8360  0.9823  0.1463  0.9354  1.0297  0.0944  
Shaanxi 7.59% 0.8288  1.2918  0.4630  0.8516  1.1951  0.3435  
Ningxia 7.35% 0.8246  0.9847  0.1601  0.7422  0.8215  0.0793  
Shanxi 6.40% 0.7589  0.8744  0.1155  0.7326  0.7949  0.0623  
Heilongjiang 6.17% 1.0738  1.3437  0.2699  1.0256  1.1994  0.1738  
Henan 5.75% 0.8247  1.2964  0.4717  0.8161  1.3400  0.5239  
Yunnan 5.53% 1.7007  1.2841  -0.4167  1.5445  1.0960  -0.4485  
Qinghai 3.03% 0.5010  1.4819  0.9809  0.5087  0.9230  0.4143  
Guizhou 2.57% 1.0422  0.8993  -0.1428  1.0138  0.7830  -0.2308  
Gansu 2.40% 0.9872  0.9294  -0.0578  0.9276  0.7976  -0.1301  
Xinjiang 1.48% 1.1251  1.7470  0.6219  0.8983  1.2340  0.3357  
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook] and Zhongguo Gongye Jingji Tongji  
  Nianjian [Statistical Yearbook of China‟s Industrial Economy], various issues. 
Note:   V = industrial value added; L = labour employment; K = Value of fixed-assets net of 
depreciation; V/L = labour productivity; A = V/[(L
0.6
)(K
0.4
)] = total factor productivity. 
Figures with no subscript refer to all enterprises; those with subscript “f” and “s” refer to FIEs 
and the sector in question, respectively. 
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Table 6. Determinants of industrial total factor productivity of sectors and provinces, 2007 
 
lnA = a + blnV + c(Vf/V)  
a b c R
2
 
Sectors 1.2449 
0.0994 
(1.9007)
*
 
-1.1865 
(-2.8849)***
 
0.2489 
Provinces 0.9322 
0.0892 
(3.239)***
 
-0.1624 
(-0.779) 
0.2755 
Sources: Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], various issues. 
Note:    V = industrial value added; A = V/[(L
0.6
)(K
0.4
)] = total factor productivity. Figures 
with no subscript refer to all industrial enterprises of the sector or province; those 
with subscript “f” refer to FIEs. ***, ** and * are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
